[SLP (Crl) 39528/18, referred to a large bench on 17.01.2019]
A bench comprising of Justice U.U. Lalit and Justice M.R. Shah expressed their difference of opinion with regards to view taken in Mohan Lal v State of Punjab by a three-judge bench. In the mentioned case, it was held that if the informant and the investigator in the NDPS cases is the same person then the accused is entitled to get acquittal.
The present case is also an NDPS matter. It reached the Supreme Court through an SLP filed against the conviction of the petitioner. In it as well, the investigation was done by the complainant police officer. So, the case of Mohan Lal was relied upon by the counsel for the defence for getting acquittal for the petitioner-accused. It was argued by him that the trial got vitiated because the complainant and the investigating officer were the same.
The bench observed in the light of the aforementioned judgment and some other judgements:
“We may prima facie express that we find it difficult to accept the view taken in Mohan Lal (Supra). Some of the decided cases have maintained a distinction in that where the investigation was conducted by the informant himself, appropriate weightage was given while appreciating the evidence. In a given case, where the complainant himself had conducted investigation, such aspect of the matter can certainly be given due weightage while assessing the evidence on record but it would be completely a different thing to say that the trial itself would be vitiated for such infraction. But Mohan Lal (Supra) has ruled that the trial itself would stand vitiated on that count.”
Thus, the case was referred to a bench. Now, the matter is being looked into by a Constitution Bench headed by Justice Arun Mishra.
Mohanlal Case
The case was pronounced on 16th August, 2018 by a three-judge bench of Justice Ranjan Gogoi, Justice R. Banumathi and Justice Navin Sinha. Justice Navin Sinha had authored the judgment. He observed:
“If an informant police official in a criminal prosecution, especially when carrying a reverse burden of proof, makes the allegations, is himself asked to investigate, serious doubts will naturally arise with regard to his fairness and impartiality. It is not necessary that bias must actually be proved. It would be illogical to presume and contrary to normal human conduct, that he would himself at the end of the investigation submit a closure report to conclude false implication with all its attendant consequences for the complainant himself. The result of the investigation would therefore be a foregone conclusion.”
It was finally held by the bench that “It is therefore held that a fair investigation, which is but the very foundation of fair trial, necessarily postulates that the informant and the investigator must not be the same person. Justice must not only be done, but must appear to be done also. Any possibility of bias or a predetermined conclusion has to be excluded. This requirement is all the more imperative in laws carrying a reverse burden of proof.”